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This chapter discusses the fast-growing UAE cities Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which, although 
emblematic of urban-centred growth, have attracted surprisingly little attention in world cities 
literature. Although the 2009 debt crisis in Dubai has questioned urban sustainability in the 
wider Gulf region, both cities have been prospering as nodes of global flows of money, people 
and goods. Perhaps most indicative of this is the fast and massive population growth both cities 
have experienced in recent decades. In Dubai, population rose from ca. 40000 in the 1960s to 
more than 1.6 million in 2008 (www.dubai.ae, accessed February 10th 2010), while Abu Dhabi’s 
urban population reached ca. 800000 in early 2010 (www.visitabudhabi.ae, accessed February 
10th 2010), compared to a mere 25000 in the 1960s. A lot of the initial population growth 
resulted from the discovery of oil in the early part of this period. As a consequence, earlier 
forms of subsistence such as pearl diving, smuggling, and manual production lost their 
importance, while the influx of oil industry workers and windfall oil money transformed these 
formerly small settlements into a specific urban form which Khalaf (2006) identifies as ‘oil 
cities’.  
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More recently, however, in a move to diversify their economies away from oil-dependency, the 
ruling families (Abu Dhabi’s al-Nahyan and Dubai’s al-Makhtoum) have endorsed the 
development of cities within their realm as centres of business, trade and advanced servicing -  
quite successfully, so it appears, as even during the global financial crisis, both Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai were identified as ‘winning’ financial centres, with banks maintaining high levels of 
profitability and capital base (see Derudder et al., 2010a). Also in terms of advanced producer 
services (APS) broadly defined (comprising accounting, advertising, finance, law and 
management consultancy), Gulf cities have become more important, as was illustrated in a 
longitudinal analysis of major APS firms between 2000 and 2008 (Derudder et al., 2010b). In 
addition, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have become global transport nodes of goods and people, both in 
terms of seaports (Jebel Ali and Port Rashid in Dubai) and accompanying free trade zones and 
maritime service providers (Jacobs and Hall, 2007), and also large-scale airports and 
international airlines such as Emirates, Etihad and so on (O’Connell, 2006). These variegated 
but coherent growth trends echo a broader geographical ‘reOrientation’ (Frank, 1998) and geo-
economic shift in the world economy, where ‘the Orient’ – China in particular – is becoming the 
‘emerging market’ on whom to keep a watchful eye. While ‘traditional’ world cities such as 
London and New York have been hit hard by the crisis, Chinese cities (most notably Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Hong Kong) are booming, while Gulf cities are profiling themselves as hubs in 
between. But also in itself, the Gulf region, floating on oil money, remains a crucial source of 
global capital. Some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), such as Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (ADIA), which holds a massive US$875 billion (Behrendt, 2008), and also 
high-net-worth private investors from that region have seized the opportunity to acquire assets 
in major key sectors and blue chip companies in ‘the West’.  
Accounts of Middle Eastern political economies have often been inclined towards an 
‘exceptionalist’ reading of contemporary processes (see for instance Aarts, 1999 on Middle 
Eastern political and economic integration), which tends to explain the failure of external 
concepts of democracy, secularism, or market-led transition as a consequence of internal – 
cultural or religious – resistance. However, the sheer growth of Gulf cities and their broad 
insertion into global circuits of capital, goods and people recalls the very essence of Friedmann’s 
(1986) seminal world city hypothesis, and suggests the world city prism of analysis as a 
universal category is relevant within the UAE’s urban context. It is true, of course, that Gulf cities 
can be identified for their idiosyncratic political economies, notably their city-state character, 
the intermingling of state and corporate spheres, the role of Islam in urban development and 
finance, and so on. But instead of the simplistic view that the Middle East is ‘not like any other 
region’, there is a need for an analysis of the Middle East which at the same time addresses 
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issues in terms of universal categories, while being sensitive to historical particularities. This is a 
need which has long been recognised (see Halliday, 1987: 215-218, who elaborates on the 
essentialist and orientalist dimensions of Middle Eastern analyses). In this chapter, therefore, I 
map the idiosyncrasies of Gulf cities to inform a more ‘global’ perspective on world cities and 
aim to open-up the particularities of Gulf city economies, as an ‘antidote’ to analyses that leave 
out regional actors, ideologies, lifestyles and others. The resilience of the ‘world city concept’, 
both as an analytical lens and as a discursive field, lies precisely in its ability to ‘travel’ and to 
become regionalized and adapted to various political economic settings. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to discuss the evolution of Abu Dhabi and Dubai as ‘emerging’ Gulf world cities 
from three interrelated perspectives. First the growth of Abu Dhabi and Dubai as a 
complementary evolution of city-states within the UAE’s federation is discussed. Second, I 
explore how ‘world city discourse’ is being employed in the construction of Abu Dhabi and, 
especially, Dubai as ‘emerging’ world cities. The focus here is specifically on the role of financial 
elites in building Dubai, and the Gulf region more generally, as a market for mainstream and 
‘Islamic’, i.e. Shari’a-compliant markets. Third and finally, I question the sustainability (broadly 
defined) of these cities and their future as post-industrial sites of production from city-level and 
regional perspectives.    
 
The UAE: a federation of quasi city-states 
The rise of two booming cities along the Gulf in such close proximity – within a mere hour’s 
drive from each other – reflects how under the conditions of the UAE’s federal configuration, 
ruling Emirati elites have actively put ‘the urban’ at the centre of economic development of their 
territories. In fact, following an ‘amalgamation’ of previously autonomous emirates, a very 
idiosyncratic political economy of ‘quasi city-states’ (Sidaway, 2008) has emerged, 
characterized by great autonomy vis-à-vis other members of the federation, and by 
public/private entanglement of the ruling family and numerous government-related enterprises 
(GREs).  
 
Regionally, the emergence of city-state entities can be framed within historical power relations 
among regional Emirati elites which mark processes of mutual political and economic 
cooperation and competition. In particular, when the British left the region in 1971, the 
emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman (and from 1972 
also Ras al-Khaimah) along the so-called Trucial Coast decided to form a federation (UAE) in 
order to counter what they feared would be imminent interference from their strong 
neighbours Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although the individual emirates thereby chose to transfer 
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power to a higher echelon, from its inception the UAE was also the stage for conflicting interests 
and strife among its members, especially between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. As argued by Peck 
(2001: 150), much of this deep-seated rivalry can be traced back historically to the 
establishment of Dubai as a separate Sheikhdom in 1833 by the disaffected Al Bu Fasalah 
subsection of the Bani Yas tribe of Abu Dhabi. Following this ‘schism’, Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
developed along different lines: Dubai as a cosmopolitan outward-looking mercantile city-state, 
while Abu Dhabi remained a more traditional tribal federation. From the nascent federation’s 
initial meetings in the late 1960s on, the charismatic Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of Abu 
Dhabi played an instrumental role in forging a federation, relying on the oil wealth of Abu Dhabi 
and its clear territorial dominance in what would later be the UAE (Davidson, 2006). This move 
to consolidate ‘national’ power around Abu Dhabi (which would be home to the federation’s 
capital and provide the new nation’s president) encountered resistance from the leader of 
Dubai, Rashid al-Makthoum, who, although lacking the oil wealth of his neighbour, was able to 
negotiate  a relatively strong influence for Dubai in the newly-forged federation, securing, for 
instance, the right of veto in the Supreme Council, provision of the federation’s vice-president 
and an equal number of votes in the Federal National Council (Peck, 2001: 150). From its 
inception, then, the federal character of the UAE state and the actions and attitudes of 
geographically separated ruling families have allowed the development of multiple autonomous 
urban centres.   
 
At the level of these individual emirates themselves, the lines between the emirate as a political 
entity (a ‘city-state’) and as a commercial/business enterprise have been substantially blurred. 
Especially in Dubai – so-called ‘Dubai Inc.’ – a highly centralised and autocratic state power, 
embodied in the emir (Prince Mohammad Al-Makhtoum) and his family, is combined with a 
quasi corporate style of administration (Davis, 2006). Both Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, such as ADIA and 
Mubadala Development Company, and Dubai’s GREs, such as Dubai Holding or Dubai World and 
its subsidiaries (Nakheel, Dubai Ports World, etc.), have become the prime vehicles for ruling 
elites to diversify the economy away from oil dependency. In contrast to SWFs which are 
generally regarded as ‘government-owned’, GREs are more like ‘semi-private entities’ set up as 
independent companies, but which nevertheless embody the state’s development strategies. 
Within this context, two modes of diversification can be identified.  
 
On the one hand, both SWFs and GREs channel and manage investments abroad. Sovereign Gulf 
investors have become involved in the ‘core’ regions of the world economy, notably Europe and 
Northern America, both in terms of buying sovereign debt and acquiring corporate assets. Along 
with China and Japan, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States have financed roughly a 
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quarter of the United States’ current-account deficit, by investing heavily in US treasury bills 
(Abdelal et al., 2008). In terms of corporate assets, Gulf investors have turned to key sectors in 
‘the West’ such as finance, the automotive industry, cultural institutions (e.g. The Louvre), and 
others. With the global financial crisis lurking in 2007, ADIA acquired a 5% share in Citigroup, 
while the Mubadala Development Company has bought itself into Ferrari, the Carlyle Group (a 
private equity firm), and the California-based chipmaker AMD. Generally, these numerous 
investments have a ‘passive’ character in the sense that they tend simply to hold assets to 
generate a stable flow of income. However, sometimes, as with the acquisition of the ports 
manager P&O by GRE Dubai Ports World in 2006, these investments generate suspicion about a 
possible underlying geostrategic agenda. In the aftermath of 9/11 the US congress regarded the 
prospect of the UAE’s presence in North American ports as a possible security breach and 
blocked the acquisition of the North American arm of P&O (Abdelal et al., 2008).  
 
On the other hand, GREs (but not so much SWFs) operate within a highly competitive and 
entrepreneurialist atmosphere to attract foreign investments, feeding into the growth of the city-
state. Dubai’s GREs in particular have been the prime vehicles for enacting the ruling families’ 
‘visionary’ city-building projects. As such they are involved in the development of luxurious 
tourist resorts (for instance the Jumeirah Resort, Burj al-Arab), building a state-of-the-art 
business and service infrastructure (Dubai International Financial Centre), logistics & trade 
hubs (Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone, Dubai Logistics City), knowledge and media centres (Dubai 
Media City, Dubai Internet City) and so on. Often foregrounded by high-profile architecture, 
these projects carry the intention to physically engineer and construct post-industrial sites of 
production through the attraction of regional and global investors.  
 
Building UAE world cities: the role of global financial elites 
Both the image and actual economic growth of UAE cities have been intensely related to their 
discursive constructions as attractive sites for global production and accumulation. In the 
efforts to make their city a node for global flows of capital, goods and people, UAE elites have 
operationalized world city discourses in their respective city-building projects. Mirroring 
examples of successful service-oriented urban economies (International Financial Centres 
(IFCs) such as Singapore and Hong Kong), or well-established ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2001) such 
as New York and London, they have aimed to build instant world cities through rhetoric (city 
marketing), form (architecture), and function (port, IFC, etc.) (Bassens et al., 2010a; Davis, 
2006). Dubai’s strategy has subsequently served as a model for urban development – an ‘urban 
growth machine’ (Molotch, 1976) if you like – throughout the Middle East (for instance in 
Amman; see Parker, 2009). Paradoxically, its spirit of urban entrepreneurialism has given rise 
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to a ‘post’-industrial city-state in an emirate which lacks any substantial industrial history, and, 
as irony would have it, this model of urban development was soon copied by cities throughout 
the wider Middle Eastern region. Before the 2009 Dubai debt crisis, the Dubai model promised 
to generate a success-story in itself, a unique safe haven for regional and international 
investments in the conflict-ridden Middle East. Dubai’s ruling al-Makhtoum family itself has 
obviously played an instrumental role in the city’s rapid development, creating the stage for 
international investments from a ‘supply-side’ perspective. They have aimed to make Dubai a 
global ‘brand’ (Bagaeen, 2007), mainly through the above-mentioned high-profile architectural 
projects and infrastructure developments, intended as the ‘tangible’ base of Dubai’s 
construction as a world city. In addition, the fiscal and juridical environment has been relaxed in 
order to attract regional and global investments: for instance, since 2002, non-UAE nationals 
have been allowed to purchase property within the emirate of Dubai. However, from a ‘demand-
side’ perspective, Dubai’s growth does more than reflect the ambitions of its leaders alone. 
Actors operating at both global and regional scales have had an active interest in building an 
investor-friendly site for production and accumulation. The following two paragraphs explore 
these developments in greater depth. 
 
First, on a global scale, business and financial elites within and around global APS firms, 
especially financial firms (such as large investment and commercial banks), have played a 
crucial role (Bassens et al. 2010b). Banking on both mainstream and ‘alternative’ (for instance, 
interest-free Islamic finance) ‘emerging markets’, financial elites in conjunction with the local 
ruling elite have discursively ‘constructed’ Dubai as an attractive investment market for 
property development, real estate, tourism, business, trade and so on. The reason, then, why oil-
depleted Dubai has been able to realize its gargantuan dream on vast amounts of borrowed 
money is because of the built-up ‘credit’ the Dubai rulers were given by transnational networks 
of financial elites, based in IFCs – London in particular – and the booming UAE cities themselves. 
Looking for profitable new markets in the affluent Gulf, investment bankers introduced 
themselves not only into mainstream debt-based finance but also into Shari’a-compliant 
financial circuits, as illustrated by the importance of sukuk (Islamic asset-based/asset-backed 
notes) in Dubai’s finance strategy. Drawing on Islamic economics, which refrains from riba 
(literally ‘growth’, but usually interpreted as interest) and avoids gharar (contractual 
uncertainty) and maysir (gambling, speculation) (see Bassens et al., 2011), the Islamic financial 
services (IFS) sector has seen rapid growth (e.g. 22.8% between 2008 and 2009, when its asset 
value amounted to US$822 billion; The Banker, 2009). As a result of windfall oil money in the 
1970s oil boom, the initial growth of the IFS sector was mainly driven by Gulf-based full-fledged 
Islamic banks (Dubai Islamic Bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank), which set out to operate in national 
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or regional markets. More recently, however, global banks have also entered Shari’a-compliant 
markets through ‘Islamic windows’ in order to tap into the rising demand for Shari’a-compliant 
financial products. Large UK banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays Capital, HSBC, 
Standard Chartered in particular have been heavily involved in establishing Dubai as a financial 
hub, not only through the setting up of well-staffed regional headquarters (mostly in the Dubai 
International Financial Centre) but also as creditors of Dubai’s ‘world city project’ through 
Islamic and conventional debt-based structures (now leaving them exposed to an estimated 
US$19 billion in outstanding debt). By using the high credibility of the Islamic sector, 
‘mainstream’ financial elites have developed Dubai as a prime ‘emerging’ market (compare with 
Sidaway & Pryke, 2000), while regional (Islamic) banks have mobilized Islam in an often 
orientalist discourse to attract Shari’a-compliant investment. Ironically, notwithstanding the 
Shari’a-base call for a return to the ‘real’ economy as a means of avoiding speculation and 
uncertainty – sukuk were designed to generate a steady flow of rent – all this ‘imageneering’ 
(compare with Lai, 2009 on the construction of Asian ‘emerging’ markets) has left Dubai 
extremely vulnerable to market bubbles, such as the collapse of property markets when the 
global financial crisis hit the region.  
 
Second, the property bubble and the debt crisis which it induced when Dubai’s GREs proved 
unable to redeem issued sukuk near the end of 2009 (see for instance the Dubai Palm developer 
Nakheel’s US$3,5 billion looming default) has highlighted regional interests in sustaining 
Dubai’s image as a haven for investment. With its government-run agencies faltering, and 
Dubai’s elites being either unwilling or unable to uphold Dubai’s status as an emerging Gulf 
‘world city’, the al-Nahyan from oil-rich Abu Dhabi decided to bail-out their neighbouring city-
state, buying US$10 billion of its soaring debt and thus enabling some of the most pressing debts 
to be redeemed. However, it is clear that this bail-out does not amount to a ‘US$10 billion blank 
check’. For the al-Nahyan, here lies the opportunity to strengthen their regional influence and 
‘fuel’ an Abu Dhabi-led state-building project, possibly bringing an end to Dubai’s days as an 
‘autonomous’ city-state. The current crisis elucidates how cycles of urban 
competition/decentralization and urban cooperation/centralization often alternate, reflecting 
the respective rising and diminishing importance of the UAE state for the cities within its 
borders. As long as Dubai was booming, the al-Makhtoum downplayed its status as member of 
the federation, portraying it as an autonomous city-state, while the state-representing al-
Nahyan in Abu Dhabi found political ‘consolation’ in providing the federation’s president. Now 
that Dubai is in trouble, apart from being eager to save the national image of the UAE as a safe 
haven for investments, the latter may very well use the bail-out as an opportunity to strengthen 
their position in the UAE state, discourage regionalist tendencies and keep Dubai’s previous 
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ambitions in check (Bassens et al., 2010b). The fate of the so-called Burj Dubai (‘tower of Dubai’) 
is perhaps most telling: although it had taken Dubai’s rulers six years to build the highest tower 
in the world, just days before its opening the skyscraper was renamed ‘Burj Khalifa’, referring to 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the current ruler of Abu Dhabi. It is hard to imagine an 
event more symbolic of the region’s underlying power configuration. 
 
UAE cities: a hallmark of limited sustainability? 
To conclude, as if we were dealing with real-life urban experiments, a focus on the UAE’s 
‘instant world cities’ (Bagaeen, 2007), which have emerged in a region lacking significant urban 
history, allows us to readdress the very premises of globalized urbanization, globalized 
urbanity, the global shift to post-industrial modes of production and rescaling processes 
towards the level of the city-state. Although strong in discourse and actual growth, the 
sustainability of the Gulf post-industrial city-state, which is arguably the dominant Gulf world 
city model, has never been without debate. Much of this chapter has elaborated upon the 
questionable economic sustainability of Gulf cities, which has been highlighted recently by 
Dubai’s debt crisis. This particular focus, however, threatens to overshadow perhaps even more 
fundamental dimensions of the UAE’s cities, namely their inability to somehow embed global 
flows of capital, knowledge and people into their fast-growing globalized urbanity in an 
ecologically and socially sustainable way. Ecologically, both cities are notorious for eyebrow-
raising energy and water consumption, be it in the form of evergreen golf courts, indoor ski 
arenas, air-conditioned malls or massive desalinization programmes. In addition, the urban 
planning of both produces car dependency and generates excess commuting, as a result of a 
zone-based perspective on how cities are to function (for example Media City, Health City, 
Sports City). Yet here again is another paradox: it is the same Abu Dhabi, an exporter of old 
school carbon energy, which is building a ‘visionary’ zero-carbon emission city, MASDAR, within 
its territory – zero-carbon after it has been built of course. As a subsidiary of Mubadala 
Development Company, this project aims to produce sustainable neighbourhoods for as much as 
40000 residents and a site for research and development of new energy technologies 
(http://www.masdar.ae/en/home/index.aspx, accessed 4 March 2010). However, while this 
new development might bring ecological relief, high property costs and legal barriers will no 
doubt make this a place for ‘the happy few’, the Emirati, and perhaps the expat community. 
Similar to lots of other high-profile property developments in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, MASDAR 
will be yet another example of how urban inequality, and in particular a three-tiered society, in 
effect a ‘set of cities’ (Elsheshtawy, 2008), of Emirati nationals, Western expats employed in 
business and services and Asian low-skilled workers, is spatially reproduced.  
9 
 
 
 
In conclusion, this leads us to reconsider the UAE’s urban sustainability from a social dimension, 
or as Elsheshtawi (2010) has urged us to do, to look “behind the urban spectacle”. In fact, the 
UAE’s globalized urbanity – in infrastructure and lived experience – is the product of an army of 
low-skilled migrant workers, typically of South Asian origin, who constitute the majority of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai’s urban population. At the same time, recalling Smith (1995) and Robinson 
(2002), these Afghans, Bangladeshis, Indians, Pakistanis and others sustain myriads of 
economic, ethnic, ideological, religious and other transurban linkages that have remained 
largely understudied in much contemporary world cities research. In the end, then, this chapter 
aims to draw attention to emerging/existing forms of transnationality that have been less 
studied, but which originate in Gulf cities themselves (for instance the globalizing Islamic 
financial services sector). Opening up these and other kinds of Gulf-based agency as a 
(analytical) source of transnationalism and globalization would add to a more ‘global’ 
perspective precisely because they would regionalize urbanization and urbanity, most certainly 
so in regions where ‘global’ cities such as London and New York as world city models appear to 
miss out on current urban realities.  
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